

# Humiliation and International Conflict Preferences

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## Abstract

Politicians and scholars often link humiliation to decisions to initiate and escalate international military conflict. Can emotions, like humiliation, actually affect international bargaining? If so, through what mechanisms does humiliation operate? Drawing on studies in neuroscience and experimental psychology, this paper offers two new mechanisms through which humiliation may influence conflict preferences: by decreasing sensitivity to the cost of conflict, and by increasing the salience of potential status loss. This change in preferences shrinks the bargaining range, increasing the probability of bargaining breakdown. I test this theory using both survey and lab experiments that exploit the carryover effects of humiliation on unrelated decisions to isolate its effects on conflict preferences. The results provide the first experimental evidence that humiliation increases individuals' preferences for conflict and that humiliation operates through the cost rather than the status mechanism.

In the early 1990s, the Chinese government launched the Patriotic Education Campaign to spread the narrative that China had a history of greatness but was humiliated by foreign powers. Scholars have suggested this has increased the Chinese government's tendency to

escalate international disputes (Callahan 2010; Wang 2012, 96). Similar narratives have influenced Indian politics. Hindu nationalist groups including the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have promoted narratives of India’s historical “humiliation and subjugation” (Singh 2013, 117). Further, scholars point to “humiliation” as a motivation for Russia’s annexation of Crimea (Larson and Shevchenko 2014).

Are public statements of humiliation merely bargaining bluster (Weiss 2014), or can humiliation actually increase willingness to fight? The answer matters because if a state’s cost of war falls, then the bargaining range shrinks, making conflict more likely (Fearon 1995). One way to reconcile rational theories with emotional influences is to allow preferences to be influenced by emotional states that change over time while actors still act rationally according to these preferences (Little and Zeitzoff 2017, 524).

Scholars have offered various mechanisms through which humiliation might increase an actor’s preference for war. Some theorize that humiliation leads to conflict because humiliated actors seek revenge (Löwenheim and Heimann 2008; Wang 2012). Others argue humiliation makes people view actors that have humiliated them as enemies (Wang 2012). Barnhart (2017) posits that the state experiencing humiliation seeks out states with high status but weak militaries to defeat in conflict to regain status lost in the initial humiliation.

I build on this work by separating the individually experienced emotion of humiliation from international events and beliefs about these events that could also influence foreign policy decisions. My theory focuses on humiliation as an emotion. Drawing from neuroscience and experimental psychology, I offer and test two new mechanisms through which humiliation could influence conflict. The first is that humiliation suppresses individuals’ sensitivity to the costs of conflict, increasing their willingness to fight. The second is that humiliation increases the salience of future status loss.

Previous empirical studies of humiliation and conflict have either used an international event, such as territory loss (Barnhart 2017), as a proxy to measure humiliation, or examined actors’ accounts of their own emotions in case studies (Barnhart 2016; Wang 2012).

Both strategies face the challenge that observationally, emotions come bundled with international events and beliefs about these events that can themselves influence preferences. Further, observational evidence cannot reveal whether humiliation changes or merely reflects preferences. Neither has previous research directly tested the mechanisms through which humiliation influences conflict preferences.

I test the theory about whether and how humiliation influences conflict preferences with both survey and lab experiments. To manipulate humiliation, I administer an autobiographical essay task (Myers and Tingley 2016). This takes advantage of the emotional carryover effects of humiliation to isolate its effects from aspects of the international environment that might be associated with humiliation and also influence conflict preferences through other means (Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2015; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004). I then independently manipulate the mechanisms of cost and status in a hypothetical international crisis in order to assess how much of humiliation's effect operates through each mechanism (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2018). I find that the emotion of humiliation does increase individuals' preferences for conflict. The evidence supports the mechanism of suppressing sensitivity to cost but not the mechanism of increasing the salience of status. I follow up with a lab experiment that shows these findings continue to hold when individuals face real, monetary costs.

This paper proceeds as follows. The first section elaborates a theory of how humiliation affects foreign policy preferences. The second describes the design of the survey experiment and analyses its results. The third contains the lab experiment testing humiliation's effect on conflict behavior. The fourth section discusses external validity, and the final section offers concluding comments.

# 1 Humiliation and International Conflict

International relations research is increasingly focusing on how actors behave and, in particular, how this behavior systematically departs from the predictions of baseline rational models (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017; Little and Zeitzoff 2017). An especially promising strand of work focuses on how emotions affect international decisions. Actors in ‘hot’ or emotional states do not make decisions the same way as actors in ‘cold’ states (Loewenstein 1996; McDermott 2004; Sayette et al. 2008, 698). Emotions can influence decisions through changing the salient aspects of a situation, changing preferences, as well as influencing what actors remember (McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005; Damasio 2005). Each of these violates the typical assumptions of rational models that actors use all available, relevant information, have stable preferences, and share common knowledge of history (Kydd and Herrera 2018; Golman, Hagmann, and Loewenstein 2017).

This emerging field has linked various emotional states and traits to conflict attitudes. Renshon, Lee, and Tingley (2017) show that emotional arousal can inhibit strategic thinking, causing actors to make suboptimal decisions in bargaining. Halperin et al. (2011) find that individuals who are high in hatred of the out-group are less likely to compromise in negotiations when angry. Zeitzoff (2014) finds that anger increases the propensity to punish among Israelis living in areas more exposed to rocket fire. Hatemi et al. (2013) find that individuals high in social fear have more negative opinions about out-groups. Stein (2015) finds that democracies that value revenge, measured by whether they allow capital punishment, are more conflict prone.

Previous theories have linked humiliation to conflict (Wang 2012; Badie 2017; Barnhart 2017). I build on this work by separating humiliation as an emotion from *events* that are experienced as humiliating. Distinguishing humiliation as an emotion from events that may cause it has several advantages. First, if humiliation is just the result of international events, then it cannot have an independent impact on foreign policy decisions. Separating humiliation from events allows theorization of the mechanisms through which humiliation influences

conflict preferences. Second, it allows examining whether particular events actually cause humiliation in the first place. Events do not come with emotions attached. The cognitive meaning individuals attribute to events (appraisal) plays an important role in determining what emotion individuals experience (Frijda 2007, 97).

Third, understanding humiliation’s emotional aspects provides micro-foundations for theories about humiliation and conflict preferences. Theorizing the effect of humiliation on individual preferences avoids the pitfalls of attributing emotions to the state (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017, 18). This enables examining individual-level differences in humiliation as well as how humiliation spreads socially through national narratives (Masterson 2018; Krebs 2015).

## 1.1 Defining Humiliation

Before theorizing about humiliation’s effects, it is necessary to define humiliation independently from international events. Hartling and Luchetta (1999) define humiliation as “the deep dysphoric feeling associated with being, or perceiving oneself as being, unjustly degraded, ridiculed, or put down—in particular, one’s identity has been demeaned or devalued” (264). This definition fits with other psychological research on humiliation and includes the role of identity in humiliation. While humiliation is an emotion experienced individually, triggers for humiliation target one’s identity, and identities may be shared socially.

The humiliated perceive that the humiliator has committed a grave injustice. This distinguishes humiliation from shame because when ashamed one feels that it is oneself who did something unjust (Leidner, Sheikh, and Ginges 2012). “People believe they deserve their shame; they do not believe they deserve their humiliation” (Klein 1991, 117). Experimental evidence supports this distinction (Fernández, Saguy, and Halperin 2015, 5).

## 1.2 Humiliation and Conflict Preferences

In order to understand the effects of humiliation on decision making, I turn to neuroscience and experimental psychology. First, humiliation is an intense emotion. An experiment that

recorded electro-encephalograms (EEG) while subjects read stories associated with various emotions found that “humiliation is indeed a particularly demanding emotional experience at the level of neuro-cognitive and emotional processing, more so than other approach-related emotions such as happiness and anger” and that “humiliation is a more intense emotional experience than happiness, shame, or anger” (Otten and Jonas 2014, 29, 32). This is important because more intense emotions are more likely to influence motivations (Smith and Pope 1992; Frijda 2007, 25-26). More cognitively demanding emotions are more likely to take control precedence, which inhibits processing of information antithetical to the action tendency of these emotions (Frijda 2007, 41).

Secondly, humiliation is an ‘approach emotion,’ which are emotions that make individuals more likely to confront the situation they are facing rather than withdraw (Otten and Jonas 2014; Elison and Harter 2007). In the case of international threat, approach emotions should increase the probability of a fight (intervene) rather than a flight (buck-passing) reaction. While humiliation has been associated with avoidance responses under certain conditions (Atran and Ginges 2008), the perception that the humiliating action is unjust increases the probability of approach reactions (Fernández, Saguy, and Halperin 2015, 6). This injustice appraisal is more likely in in-group/out-group comparisons because motivated reasoning leads people to see their own group as the victim (Herrmann 2017, 67).

Third, unlike similar emotions, such as shame, humiliation is associated with the perception of a hostile perpetrator (Fernández et al. 2018, 2). Because emotions direct attention to actions that remedy the emotional concern at stake (Mesquita and Frijda 2011, 782), humiliation motivates action against perceived perpetrators. Further, this hostility is not limited to perceived humiliators but can extend to other actors as well (Elison and Harter 2007; Barnhart 2017, 319; Frijda 2007, 274).

To date, there is limited evidence linking humiliation to conflictual responses, particularly lacking is experimental evidence that would give the most confidence there is a causal relationship. Much of the psychological work on humiliation tends to focus on the causes

rather than the effects of humiliation, and the work on humiliation's effects is often observational (Fernández, Saguy, and Halperin 2015, 2). In fact, "In the case of humiliation, very little is known about its behavioral consequences [...]" (Otten and Jonas 2014, 32). This makes the development of theories of humiliation and conflict with clear micro-foundations even more important.

This leads to the hypothesis that:

**Hypothesis 1 (H1)** *The emotional state of humiliation increases individuals' preferences for conflict.*

The next question how humiliation does this. Drawing on the ability of emotions to direct attention (McDermott 2004, 694), I offer two new mechanisms through which humiliation may influence conflict preferences.

First, humiliation should increase individuals' preferences for conflict by making them less sensitive to the cost of conflict. Emotions have a corresponding action readiness that prepares the person experiencing them to achieve a particular aim (Frijda 2007, 27). These action tendencies are "reward insensitive", meaning that "Foresight of bad outcomes tends not to deflect from their purpose [... For example,] in urge for revenge, you risk sacrificing your life [...]" (Frijda 2007, 46). This is particularly the case for strong emotions (Elster 2012, 156-58). Further, emotions interfere with the processing of information that is antithetical to their action tendency (Frijda 2007, 41). The especially intense cognitive demands humiliation poses make it particularly likely to interfere (Otten and Jonas 2014, 29, 32). Because humiliation with a strong injustice appraisal leads to a hostile approach action tendency, individuals experiencing humiliation may discount the costs of taking hostile actions or simply be less able to integrate this information into their decision process. The emotional event appraised as humiliating causes pain, and the desire to escape from this pain helps explain why the response is "often immoderate" (Frijda 2007, 274). Therefore:

**Hypothesis 2a (H2a)** *Humiliation decreases individuals' sensitivity to the costs of conflict.*

There are two reasons why this cost mechanism is distinct from prospect theory's prediction that leaders in the domain of loss will become more risk acceptant (Levy 1992). First, the emotional experience of humiliation is not the same as being in the domain of losses with regard to the decision at hand. For example, one could be humiliated for personal reasons, but as long as one is in this state, one is less sensitive to the cost of conflict in general. Second, *cost sensitivity* and *risk preference* are not the same. Given two options with the same expected value, a risk acceptant person will choose the riskier option. In contrast, being less sensitive to cost changes the expected value of the options because cost now has a lower impact on the utility function. If you are less sensitive to cost, then you are more likely to choose a strategy that could result in costly conflict, independently of the likelihood that strategy will lead to conflict (the risk).

The second candidate mechanism is that humiliation increases attentiveness to the possibility that status could be lost. People in humiliated states express heightened fears of future humiliations (Hartling and Luchetta 1999, 263, 270). Further, status loss is one of the most frequent causes of humiliation (Otten and Jonas 2014; Klein 1991), so humiliated individuals should be particularly attentive to the possibility of status loss. Because emotions motivate the resolution of the emotional concern that gave rise to them and because humiliation is an approach response that makes fight rather than flight reactions more likely, individuals are more likely to turn to conflict to prevent this status loss.

**Hypothesis 2b (H2b)** *Humiliation increases the salience of future status loss.*

This explanation supposes that humiliation increases the *salience* rather than the *value* of status loss. This is important because leaders in general tend to value status (Renshon 2017). However, when facing conflict there are many issues at stake and leaders cannot keep them all in mind at once. Instead they assess how a policy will affect one or two salient values and this influences their assessment of the policy's other impacts (Jervis 1976, 137). Affect makes some risks more salient than others (Vertzberger 1998, 45). In situations where the status implications of a dispute are not obvious, humiliated individuals are more likely to



believe that status is at stake. This can increase their assessment of the stakes and, hence, willingness to fight. However, in situations where status is clearly at stake, humiliation should not influence conflict preferences through this mechanism.

### 1.2.1 Does This Apply to Elites?

A critic could argue that leaders do not make decisions about conflict on a whim and can delay their decisions to limit the effect of extreme emotions (McDermott 2004). However, elites are not necessarily motivated by the high stakes of their decisions to use better information processing techniques, even when they are not under time pressure (Vertzberger 1998, 390). Leaders may be unable to avoid emotional influences even with conscious effort. Individuals in hot states struggle to imagine how they would think in cold states (Loewenstein 1996, 281-284).<sup>1</sup> This makes it difficult to recognize whether and how emotions are impacting one's judgment.

The ability of current events to trigger past memories of humiliation is another factor that may make humiliation especially long lasting. Current humiliation increases thinking about past humiliation through mood-dependent memory (McDermott 2004; Frijda 2007, 273). When humiliation acts through one's group identity, its effects are likely to persist for long periods of time because each new confrontation brings back memories of the humiliating event (Löwenheim and Heimann 2008; Frijda 2007, 272-273). Past experiences of humiliation are associated with vulnerability to and fear of future humiliation (Hartling and Luchetta 1999, 263, 270). Indeed, the CCP often explicitly links current foreign policy humiliations to China's humiliating past (Wang 2012). These connections may make it difficult to address international crises coolly, even if the decision is delayed, because to make the decision, the leaders must return their thoughts to a crisis that has already been invested with emotional meaning.

Rational decision-making cannot be separated from emotions, and leaders, not just the

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<sup>1</sup>See also Nordgren, Pligt, and Harrevelde (2007), and Van Boven and Loewenstein (2005), and Sayette et al. (2008).

public, experience emotional influences on their decisions (McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005; Damasio 2005). Even China’s top leadership discussing the United States’ 1999 bombing of a Chinese embassy in Belgrade—accidental according to U.S. accounts—behind closed doors speculated that it was done intentionally to humiliate China (Zong 2002). The fact that content of this discussion was not intended to be public suggests that the leaders’ connection of national humiliation to this incident was not simply instrumental.

Experiments conducted on leader and public perceptions about conflict have “obtained nearly identical results” (Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo 2017). The experimental evidence is beginning to stack up against the idea that elites are more rational or less biased decision makers than the public (Hafner-Burton et al. 2014; Renshon 2015; Sheffer et al. 2018). In the context of emotions, the evidence suggests that, if anything, politically sophisticated individuals are more likely to have emotional responses to politics and that these responses have a greater influence on their behavior (Miller 2011). Regarding bargaining, experiments show that elites are even more likely than the general public to reject unfavorable offers that are still better than no deal (LeVeck et al. 2014). This does not imply that leaders act *irrationally* in the sense of acting against their preferences (Little and Zeitzoff 2017, 524). Rather, it means preferences are endogenous to emotional states.

However, even if leaders themselves are somehow isolated from the influences of emotions, public pressure can force them to behave as though they are influenced. This is not limited to democracies. The Japanese premier who signed the Washington System treaties, which limited the build-up of naval forces in the Pacific prior to WWII, was shot and killed by a nationalist (Campbell 2016, 109). Chinese officials are wary of moderating China’s South China Sea claims for fear of being proclaimed a “traitor who suggests backing down” (Lynch 2015, 196). Some contend that nationalism and the emotions it evokes are more influential in authoritarian regimes than in democracies because nationalism is often the only accepted form of public criticism.<sup>2</sup> Further, it is difficult for leaders to change nationalist narratives

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<sup>2</sup>See He (2007, 18) and Shen (2010, 103).

in the short term, and authoritarian regimes that base their legitimacy in nationalism risk instability when they repress nationalists (Gries 2005, 46, 120). Even if the probability of losing office is lower for autocrats, they may be more sensitive to it because they face harsher consequences, such as death and imprisonment, than democratic leaders who lose office (Debs and Goemans 2010).

## 2 Testing Humiliation’s Impact on Expressed Conflict Preferences

Observational research faces two big challenges in disentangling humiliation’s effect on conflict preferences. First, humiliation in international relations always comes bundled with international events appraised as humiliating as well as beliefs about these events and the actors involved. It is impossible to tell whether it is the emotion of humiliation or these events and/or beliefs that are driving responses (Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2015, 570). Second, retrospective accounts of emotional decision making are unreliable. These accounts may be strategic self-justifications. Further, experiments show individuals can misunderstand emotional influences on their own decisions (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Frijda 2007, 96). For these reasons, An experiment where known emotional states are assigned independently of information about the international environment is necessary identify the effect of humiliation on conflict preferences.

If the effect of humiliation on conflict preferences is difficult to identify with observational data, the mechanisms through which humiliation influences these preferences are hopelessly confounded. For the reasons described above, actors’ after-the-fact explanations of how they felt and made their decisions are insufficient. Moreover, if humiliation results from the international situation itself, then aspects of the international situation that cause humiliation might also mediate how a humiliated individual responds to that situation, further confounding analysis of the causal mechanism (Imai et al. 2011; Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2018).

For example, if an individual is threatened with a costly conflict they might feel that they are suffering an injustice, making them feel humiliated, but decreased sensitivity to cost might also be a mechanism through which humiliation operates. To avoid this problem, the emotion and the mechanism must be manipulated independently in an experiment.

## 2.1 Survey Experiment Design

The first of two experiments reported here is a survey experiment on the effect of humiliation on Americans' support for international military interventions. The survey experiment was conducted on 804 adult American respondents recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) from April 16<sup>th</sup> to May 4<sup>th</sup> 2018.<sup>3</sup> The experiment is a  $3 \times 2 \times 2$ , (shame, humiliation, control)  $\times$  (costly, not costly)  $\times$  (status invoked, status not invoked), factorial design. Following Myers and Tingley (2016), I use autobiographical essay tasks to manipulate emotions and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X) to measure emotions (Watson and Clark 1999). Respondents are randomly assigned to write about a time in their life when they were humiliated, a time when they were shamed, or their last trip to the grocery store, which is the control condition (see Appendix section G for the full essay prompts and survey instrument). Respondents had to write at least 140 characters before advancing to the next question. The shame manipulation is included to rule out the possibility that negative affect rather than humiliation drives the results. Further, shame is considered the emotion most similar to humiliation and is commonly compared with humiliation in the experimental psychology literature (Otten and Jonas 2014; Combs et al. 2010; Elison and Harter 2007; Hartling and Luchetta 1999). If humiliation increases individuals' preferences for conflict but shame does not, this would provide strong evidence that this effect is uniquely due to humiliation. Because the PANAS-X does not have a scale for humiliation, I create a novel scale based on the definition of humiliation in Hartling and Luchetta (1999). The Appendix section G.4 shows these scales, and section I uses principal component analysis to validate


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<sup>3</sup>See section 4 for more information on the sample.

the new measure of humiliation.

Treating personal feelings of humiliation has the advantage of separating humiliation from confounding aspects of the international situation. This exploits the way incidental emotions, that is emotions not related to the decision at hand, carry over to influence political judgments to “cleanly estimate the ‘pure’ effect” of humiliation (Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2015, 570).<sup>4</sup> Because the humiliation in this experiment comes from the personal lives of respondents rather than the hostile actions of another country (which might lead them to seek revenge) or the perceived loss of status of their nation, these mechanisms are blocked in the experiment and will not confound the analysis of the hypothesized mechanisms.

Figure 1: Survey Experiment Design



Emotional measurement is conducted immediately after the essay task. I deviate from Myers and Tingley (2016) in that I omit measurement of joviality (happiness) as well as the general positive and negative affect scales. Myers and Tingley (2016) find that their essay treatments “failed to manipulate positive emotions in any meaningful way” (496), making it unlikely that essays targeting humiliation would trigger happiness or positive affect. It is important not to include unnecessary questions between the essay and the outcome because the emotional effect of the essay is likely to decay over time, biasing results towards zero (Myers and Tingley 2016, 498). Of the negative emotions, I include measures of fear, hostility (anger), and guilt (shame).

Using these emotional measures is necessary because passive measures of physiological arousal, such as skin-conductance reactivity, measure general arousal and not particular

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<sup>4</sup>See also (Small and Lerner 2008).

emotions (Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2015, 575). Measuring particular emotions is important because conclusions might be confounded by related emotions that are also triggered by the treatment (Myers and Tingley 2016). The risk that subjects might rely on “implicit causal theories” when inferring their emotions is unlikely to bias the results in these experiments because those theories would relate to the subjects’ personal lives rather than the outcome, which is about foreign policy decisions (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2015, 570).

Following Myers and Tingley (2016), I use the effect of the targeted emotion as mediated by the emotional score based on the emotional scales (the ACME) as the primary quantity of interest. This is because even though autobiographical essay tasks target particular emotions, they will inevitably move subjects on other emotions as well. This makes interpreting the total effect misleading and can result in spurious findings (Myers and Tingley 2016, 498).

After answering the emotional items, respondents receive a vignette similar to vignettes used in other international relations experiments (Kertzer 2016; Tomz 2007). Respondents read that a country has invaded a smaller neighboring state that shares interests with the US but is not a US ally. These details are included to increase the probability that the information equivalence assumption is satisfied (Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2017). If respondents are told that US status is at stake in a dispute, they might think other US interests are more likely to be at stake or that the invaded country is more likely to be a US ally. Fixing these conditions prevents the treatments from unintentionally manipulating them. This may reduce the generality of the experiment to decisions about protecting countries that share some interests with the US but are not allies. However, it is unlikely the US would intervene to protect a country with no shared interests, and the US is legally obligated to help allies. Therefore, non-allies who share interests with the US are the most interesting case to study.

The description of the international situation varies whether it would be ‘very costly’

or ‘not very costly’ for the US to use military force.<sup>5</sup> The scenario also varies whether US status is explicitly at stake. The condition says either, ‘US interests as well as US world status’ or only ‘US interests’ is at stake.

Even in a design that can isolate the effect of humiliation from other factors, independent manipulation of the causal mechanisms is critical. This is because humans give accounts “post hoc that serve to explain or justify the emotion” they experienced (Frijda 2007, 96). For example, if asked after the outcome question whether or not they believed that US status was at stake in the dispute or that intervening would be of low cost, individuals whose decision to intervene was emotionally driven might readily seize on these logical justifications, making it impossible to tell if these causal mechanisms actually drove their preferences for conflict.

The outcome question is whether or not respondents support using US troops to push back the invader. Respondents then indicate whether or not they feel strongly about this. These two questions are combined into a four point outcome scale measuring intervention support.<sup>6</sup>

The experiment includes placebo questions about whether respondents believe that the country being invaded is a democracy as well as whether they think that the invader is committing major human rights violations. These are to ensure that respondents are not inferring more than is intended from the manipulations (Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2017).

## 2.2 Survey Experiment Results

### 2.2.1 Effect of Emotional Essay Tasks on Target Emotions

Each essay treats the emotion it is intended to target more than other emotions. For humiliation, hostility (anger) is a secondary target because humiliation involves moral outrage. As Fernández et al. (2018) explain, “hostility is consubstantial to this emotion, so that people who feel humiliated perceive also that they are the targets of an external attack against their


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<sup>5</sup>This condition taken from Tomz and Weeks (2016).

<sup>6</sup>Taken from Kertzer (2016, 174).

selves” (10). The fact that non-target emotions, such as fear, are also moved by the essays, although to a lesser extent, is to be expected with emotional essay tasks and is the reason using causal mediation to estimate the effect of the treatment through the targeted emotion is necessary (Myers and Tingley 2016). See Appendix section E for a discussion of potential attrition across treatment groups.

Figure 2: Effect of Essay Treatments on Emotions



Each essay is compared with all other conditions. The bars show 95% confidence intervals. Emotions are on a 0 to 1 scale.

### 2.2.2 Effect of Humiliation on Intervention Support

In the models that produce the results shown below, controls are only included for experimentally manipulated conditions.<sup>7</sup> In the causal mediation models used to estimate the effect of the emotional essays through the target emotion, controls for the status and cost manipulations are included in the outcome stage but not in the stage modeling the effect of the essay on the target emotion because this effect is measured before respondents receive either the status or cost manipulation (see Appendix section J for the full causal mediation results). All variables are rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparability. The placebo tests find


<sup>7</sup>This includes wave dummies for minor differences in the survey. See Appendix section G.1 for a complete explanation.



neither the cost nor status manipulation inadvertently manipulated respondents' perceptions about the regime type of the country being invaded or whether the invader is committing major human rights violations.<sup>8</sup>

As hypothesized (H1), Humiliation increases support for intervention, but shame does not. The difference between the ACMEs of humiliation and shame is also significant.<sup>9</sup> The ACME of humiliation might seem small, but its magnitude is about half that of the effect of moving the intervention from 'very costly' to 'not very costly'. According to rational models, the cost of war should play a major role in an individual's intervention support, so the fact that humiliation's effect is about half that of cost means it is a substantively important effect. The status manipulation does not change respondent support for intervention on its own. The section below explores whether the ACME of the humiliation treatment through humiliation changes as the mechanisms are fixed at certain values to assess the support for H2a and H2b.

Figure 3: Effect on Intervention Support



The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

<sup>8</sup>The p-values in t-tests are  $> 0.1$ .

<sup>9</sup>This is true whether all of the points of the simulation are used or if the simulation of each effect is restricted to the first 235 points for humiliation and 249 for shame to reflect the number of respondents in each condition. This is done to address the concern that the simulation of the ACMEs for shame and humiliation might bias the standard error downward by exaggerating the amount of data points.

### 2.2.3 Mechanisms


Figure 4 shows the ACMEs of humiliation and shame as the cost of the intervention varies between ‘very costly’ and ‘not very costly’. Supporting H2a, humiliation significantly increases support for intervention when the intervention is ‘very costly’ but not when the intervention is ‘not very costly’. The fact that humiliation’s ACME is almost 0 when the intervention is ‘not very costly’ suggests that nearly the entire effect of humiliation operates through suppressing sensitivity to costs. Further, humiliation increases support for intervention in the costly condition almost as much as the costly condition decreases support for intervention in the sample overall (an increase of 0.076 vs. a decrease of 0.079), which suggests that humiliation nearly eliminates the costliness of intervention from respondents’ decision making. Figure 5 provides further evidence for this interpretation by showing that the effect of the cost of intervention becomes undetectable as a respondents’ humiliation score increases.<sup>10</sup>

The ACME of shame is not significant in either cost condition. Further, the ACMEs of humiliation and shame in the costly condition remain statistically distinguishable from each other. This follows theoretical expectations because even if shame’s action tendencies are cost insensitive, shame should not have a conflictual action tendency because it is not an approach emotion. Neither does shame involve the attribution of hostility to an other. The outcome has plenty of variation across the cost conditions (see Appendix section C), which gives confidence that neither floor nor ceiling effects limit the results.

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
<sup>10</sup>These marginal effects come from a regression that interacts the effect of cost with respondents’ humiliation scores while controlling for experimental conditions and waves. Removing the covariates does not affect this result.

Figure 4: Effect on Intervention Support Varying Cost




The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

Figure 5: Humiliation Attenuates Effect of Cost



The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

Figure 6 shows how the effects of humiliation and shame change when US status is invoked as opposed to when it is not mentioned. The ACME of humiliation is approximately the same in both status conditions, which suggests that status neither mediates nor moderates the effect. Further, the absence of an effect of the status manipulation by itself calls into question its potential as a mechanism. Overall, H2b is not supported.



The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

### 3 Testing Humiliation’s Effect on Conflict Behavior

If humiliation actually affects conflict preferences through individuals’ sensitivity to cost, then this should be visible in behavior when the cost of acting is real rather than hypothetical. A limitation of the survey experiment is that it is relatively costless for respondents to express support for a hypothetical war. A critic could argue that respondents express support for war when humiliated because it makes them feel better, but if faced with actual cost, they would exert more effort to control their emotions and make a less costly decision (Dickson 2011).

To address this, I introduce the humiliation and control essay treatments into a laboratory experiment where respondents play an incentivized game with a monetary cost to war.<sup>11</sup> In

<sup>11</sup>The pre-analysis plan for this experiment is available here <https://egap.org/file/3918/download?token=0cjKbRCe>. Deviations from this plan are indicated in footnotes.

addition to the emotional essay conditions (humiliation and control), I assign the cost of war to be either high or low, so it is a  $2 \times 2$  factorial experiment. The laboratory experiment also adds to the overall confidence in the results because, unlike the survey experiment, there is no post-treatment attrition.

### 3.1 Lab Experiment Design

I recruited 196 participants from the University of Wisconsin–Madison BRITE Lab participant pool. The experiment took place in 26 sessions lasting approximately 40 minutes each. The smallest session had 4 participants, and the largest had 14. Sessions were conducted in 2019 from May 21 to June 7 and from June 17 to June 21.<sup>12</sup> Participants received \$5 in addition to the money they earned from the incentivized game.<sup>13</sup> Respondents first answer demographic and disposition questions, and then receive instructions on how the experiment will progress as well as how to play the incentivized game (the game is described in detail below and the full instrument appears in the appendix section H). Respondents input all of their actions in a computer terminal and are instructed not to communicate with each other.<sup>14</sup> First, respondents play 5 practice rounds of the game. The practice rounds are to control both for the effect of learning about the game over time and any emotional effect of playing the game. In each round, players are randomly rematched with an anonymous opponent to avoid reputation effects.

Respondents are instructed that they will be paid based on one randomly selected round of the game (excluding the practice rounds). Respondents’ pretreatment emotional states are measured as they are in the survey experiment. Next, respondents play 4 rounds of the game that provide a pretreatment measure of respondent behavior. Afterward, respondents are randomly assigned to write either the control or the humiliation essay, and their emotional

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<sup>12</sup>The week of June 17 was not included in the pre-analysis plan, but the lab became available at this time because another experiment was canceled. The total number of participants is within the range specified in the pre-analysis plan.

<sup>13</sup>The pretreatment data for 6 of these participants was lost when the server crashed during a session.

<sup>14</sup>The game is implemented using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).

state is measured again. Lastly, respondents play 4 more rounds of the game.

The incentivized game is an extended form game where the first player must choose either to attack or not. After the first player moves, the second player observes the first player's move and chooses either to attack or not. If both players choose not to attack, then both players receive their payoff for the status quo  $s$  (the game is symmetrical so payoffs have no subscripts). If one player chooses not to attack and the other player chooses to attack, then the player who chose not to attack receives their war payoff for getting struck first  $w^s$  and the other player receives their war payoff for striking first  $w^f$ . If both players choose to attack, then they both receive their war payoff of  $w$ . War payoffs are equal to the player's probability of winning the war  $p$  minus their cost of conflict  $c$  (see equation 1). The probability of winning is greatest when first striking and next greatest when both strike so that  $w^f > w > w^s$ .


$$\begin{aligned}
 w &= p - c \\
 w^f &= \bar{p} - c \\
 w^s &= \underline{p} - c \\
 \bar{p} &> p > \underline{p}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

A key property of this game is that it has two unique equilibria depending on  $c$ . When  $c$  is high enough that  $s > w^f$ , then the unique equilibrium is both players choose not to attack. Otherwise, if  $w^f > s$ , then both players should choose to attack. This means the game switches between a stag hunt and a prisoner's dilemma based on  $c$ . This allows me to manipulate  $c$  and assess whether players successfully adapt their behavior to the changing cost of war. If H2a is accurate, then players who are humiliated should be more likely to choose war in stag hunt, even though their payoff is reduced because of the higher cost of war.

The game is presented in game theoretical form here to highlight the link to the theory, but participants only see their payoffs in dollar amounts. The dollar value of the  $s$  payoff is

always \$6. When the cost of war is high the war payoffs are as follows:  $w = \$3$ ,  $w^f = \$5$ , and  $w^s = \$2$ . When the cost of war is low the war payoffs are as follows:  $w = \$5$ ,  $w^f = \$7$ , and  $w^s = \$4$ .

Figure 7: Extended Form Game




### 3.2 Between Subjects Results

The between subjects results are tested using the same Myers and Tingley (2016) setup used to analyze the survey experiment, where the main quantity of interest is the ACME of the humiliation essay through the measure of humiliation. I control for whether a respondent is a first mover and include period fixed effects.<sup>15</sup>

Figure 8 shows the effect of the essay treatment on respondent emotions. As in the survey experiment, the humiliation essay has the largest effect on humiliation but also moves other emotions, making it important to analyze the ACME of the essay through the targeted emotion (Myers and Tingley 2011). Figure 9 shows the ACME of the humiliation essay

<sup>15</sup>Just as in the survey experiment analysis and in accord with my pre-analysis plan, I do not control for demographic covariates.


Figure 8: Effect of Essay on Emotions (Between Subjects)



The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

through the emotion of humiliation on the probability of attacking. The effect is positive and statistically significant only when the cost of war is high, supporting 2a.

Figure 9: ACME Across Cost Conditions (Between Subjects)



The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

### 3.3 Within Subjects Results

The within subjects tests are conducted using logistic regression with whether a subject attacked in a particular round as the dependent variable.<sup>16</sup> Figure 10 shows the change in respondent emotions before and after treatment. Because the within subjects results


<sup>16</sup>As in previous results, only randomly assigned covariates are controlled for. In contrast with my pre-analysis plan, I was unable to include period fixed effects for the within subjects results because periods perfectly correlate with treatment. I conduct placebo tests to assess the concern that period effects are driving the results. See appendix section L.



allow use of within subject measures of change in humiliation but the essay still manipulates unintended emotions, I use the interaction term between the humiliation essay and the measure of humiliation to get the effect of increases in the target emotion created by the treatment. Figure 11 shows the coefficient on the interaction term between the treatment and humiliation across cost conditions. The effect is in the hypothesized direction when conflict is costly, but, unlike the between subject results, this effect is not statistically significant.


One possible explanation for this is that the effect of the essay treatment on humiliation decays over time. If so, as the number of rounds after treatment increases, the effect dissipates, making it harder to detect an effect when including all post-treatment rounds. My pre-analysis plan includes a strategy to examine this, which is to rerun the results, excluding the last two post-treatment rounds. Figure 12 shows these results. The point estimate of the effect when conflict is costly increases about five-fold when compared with the results that include all of the post-treatment rounds, and the effect becomes statistically significant. This suggests that humiliation does increase respondents' probability of attacking when attacking is costly and that this effect decays when respondents are no longer experiencing (or experiencing less) humiliation.

Figure 10: Effect of Essay on Emotions (Within Subjects)




The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

Figure 11: Effect of Humiliation on Attack Probability (Within Subjects and Including All Rounds)



The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

Figure 12: Effect of Humiliation on Attack Probability (Within Subjects and Excluding Last 2 Post-treatment Rounds)



The bars show 95% confidence intervals. All variables scaled from 0 to 1.

## 4 External Validity

When assessing external validity it is important to keep in mind that external validity is not a property of any one study. Instead, external validity applies to a research program as replications examine whether the theorized relationship holds in different contexts (McDermott 2011, 34-35). First confidently establishing an effect exists is necessary to extrapolate that effect to other cases (Jimenez-Buedo and Miller 2010, 319). In terms of the research program on humiliation and international conflict, section 2 explains why observational work cannot establish humiliation influences conflict preferences. This makes these experiments

important contributions, and the mechanisms uncovered here can help provide guidance to future observational studies in determining what cases and mechanisms to scrutinize.

One concern could be that treating personal humiliation creates a more intense emotional experience than treating national humiliation, so asking respondents to think about personal humiliation overestimates the effect. However, when politicians promote narratives of national humiliation, these narratives are heavily represented in the media and education system (Wang 2012; Masterson 2018). A survey experiment cannot match the saturation and duration of these campaigns, so a stronger treatment is used to mimic this cumulative effect. Additionally, a real-life international crisis is likely to be much more emotional than the conditions that can be created in any experiment, especially for decision makers.

Section 1.2.1 addresses the issue of whether elites behave differently than the general population when it comes to emotions and politics, but how reflective the samples are of the general population remains to be discussed. The Appendix section B shows the demographic characteristics of the survey sample. MTurk samples tend to be more representative of the US population than most convenience samples used in political science, and the ways that they differ (respondents skew younger and more liberal) are well documented, making it easy to assess the direction of the bias when generalizing to the population as a whole (Huff and Tingley 2015; Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). Examining whether the effect of the humiliation treatment varies across demographic groups finds limited evidence of heterogeneous effects, which suggests that changing the composition of the sample would be unlikely to alter the results (see appendix section D). In general, large-scale replication projects have found that political science experiments on MTurk tend to produce similar treatment effects to experiments on nationally representative samples in the US (Mullinix et al. 2015).

The value of the laboratory experiment is to probe the generalizability of the survey experiment to conditions where decision makers face real costs rather than to represent a particular target population. A skeptic might point out that the stakes of an actual war are

much greater than the monetary incentives in the lab experiment. However, the empirical work on stakes in experiments suggests that to the extent that stakes change behavior, the difference between the effect of moderate stakes and no stakes is much greater than that between moderate stakes and increased stakes.<sup>17</sup>

## 5 Conclusion

Preferences that determine the size of the bargaining range are at the core of rational theories of international conflict. Understanding how emotions change these preferences is an important part of integrating rational theories with how actors actually behave (Kertzer 2017; Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2017; Hafner-Burton et al. 2017; Little and Zeitzoff 2017). This paper presents a novel theory explaining how the emotion of humiliation influences foreign policy preferences. Further, it elaborates two mechanisms derived from work in neuroscience and experimental psychology that could explain this effect. The first mechanism is that humiliation decreases sensitivity to the cost of conflict. The second mechanism is that humiliation might increase the propensity for individuals to believe that status is at stake when status is not otherwise salient. Both mechanisms would increase willingness to fight, reducing the bargaining range and increasing the risk of bargaining breakdown.

The results provide the first experimental evidence that humiliation increases individuals' preferences for international conflict. This is an important empirical contribution because psychological research on emotions cautions against relying on individuals' accounts of emotional decisions, which inevitably compose observational data. Further, observational cases of humiliation in international conflict are confounded by beliefs about events and actors that come bundled with the appraisal of an event as humiliating.

Additionally, this paper provides the first evidence able to distinguish the support for different mechanisms through which humiliation might foster conflict. The independent manipulation of the emotion of humiliation and the mechanisms allows the experiments

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<sup>17</sup>See Camerer and Hogarth (1999), Holt and Laury (2001), and Hertwig and Ortmann (2003).

to avoid the confounding from the potentially endless ways through which emotions might impact decision-making by isolating particular mechanisms.

The findings indicate that humiliation increases individuals' preferences for conflict by decreasing their sensitivity to the cost of conflict. This effect continues to hold when individuals face real, monetary costs to initiating conflict. Future research could also examine whether these findings hold up on samples representing different target populations and whether the institutional and/or group decision-making environments that leaders are embedded in can attenuate humiliation's effect.

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## A Summary Statistics

### A.1 Survey Experiment Summary Statistics

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Intervention Support	0.49	0.38	0.00	1.00
Age	36.40	11.58	18	84
Male	0.48	0.50	0	1
Education	4.23	1.31	1	7
Income	4.24	2.70	1	9
MTurk Today	223.51	1,960.02	0	30,000
MTurk Week	74.75	222.51	0	5,000
Mturk Life	20,592.38	353,278.30	0	10,000,000
Control Essay	0.40	0.49	0	1
Humiliation Essay	0.29	0.46	0	1
Shame Essay	0.31	0.46	0	1
Humiliation Score	0.24	0.29	0.00	1.00
Shame Score	0.28	0.31	0.00	1.00
Hostility Score	0.23	0.27	0.00	1.00
Fear Score	0.18	0.26	0.00	1.00
Status Invoked	0.50	0.50	0	1
Costly	0.50	0.50	0	1
Liberalism	3.82	1.81	1	6
Democrat	3.88	1.68	1	6
Military Assertiveness	0.46	0.21	0.00	1.00

## B Respondent Demographics

### B.1 Survey Experiment Demographics

Figure 13: Age of Respondents




Figure 14: Sex of Respondents




Figure 15: Race of Respondents




Figure 16: Ideology of Respondents




Figure 17: Party of Respondents








Figure 18: Military Assertiveness of Respondents



# C Outcome Distribution


## C.1 Survey Experiment Outcome Distribution

Figure 19: Outcome Distribution by Cost of Intervention



## C.2 Lab Experiment Outcome Distribution

Figure 20: Outcome Distribution by Cost of Intervention




## D Heterogeneous Effects

Do respondents respond the same way to the humiliation treatment across demographic groups? I will focus on the survey results because there are less demographic differences among the laboratory participants, who are all students at the same university. Further, the smaller sample of the laboratory experiment makes it harder to estimate heterogeneous effects with confidence. I compare the emotional response to the humiliation essay with the response to the control essay across pretreatment observables.

To analyze this, I use a causal forest model because these models have several properties that make them especially desirable for exploring heterogeneous effects. They allow me to run a single nonparametric model that permits the treatment effect to potentially be heterogeneous across all pretreatment covariates, without assuming that it is heterogeneous across any of them. Further, causal forest estimates have the asymptotic properties of consistency and normality (Wager and Athey 2018). The results below come from a single random forest model that contains 4,000 trees.

To examine variation in effects across groups, I first predict the effect for each individual and plot those effects by their ranks (White II 2018). The more heterogeneity exists, the greater the difference in the predicted effect among individuals. I also show 95% confidence intervals for these predicted effects. Figure 21 shows that the model predicts an increase in the measure of humiliation across all individuals in response to the humiliation treatment. Further, the point estimate of the predicted effect ranges from just below 0.3 to just above 0.4 on the 1 point scale. This suggests that subjects respond broadly similarly to the humiliation treatment.

Figure 21: Estimated Treatment Effect for Each Individual




This is the estimated effect of the humiliation essay on a respondent's humiliation score compared with the control condition.

Below, I examine each pretreatment covariate specifically to see if the effect of the humiliation essay differs across it. For continuous and ordinal variables, I show how the effect differs for each quartile. While the difference between men and women does not quite reach the threshold of significance, the evidence does suggest that women may have responded more strongly than men to the treatment by about 0.1 on the 1 point scale. The difference between Democrats and Republicans likewise does not quite reach significance but is similarly suggestive that democrats may have responded by about 0.1 points more to treatment on average. The only difference that is statistically significant is when the first quartile of military assertiveness is compared to all other quartiles. In this case, it appears that those in the lowest quartile of military assertiveness responded more strongly to the treatment by about 0.15 points on average.


Considering that more than 25 different covariate levels are being compared here, we would expect to find some significant results by chance. The fact that only 1 comparison is significant suggests that any heterogeneity in the effect is likely to be limited, which is consistent with Figure 21.

Figure 22: Estimated Treatment Effect by Age



This is the estimated effect of the humiliation essay on a respondent's humiliation score compared with the control condition.


Figure 23: Estimated Treatment Effect by Gender



This is the estimated effect of the humiliation essay on a respondent's humiliation score compared with the control condition.


Education is measured ordinally and the cutoff for the median and the third quartile are the same.

Figure 24: Estimated Treatment Effect by Education



This is the estimated effect of the humiliation essay on a respondent's humiliation score compared with the control condition.


Figure 25: Estimated Treatment Effect by Income



This is the estimated effect of the humiliation essay on a respondent's humiliation score compared with the control condition.




Figure 26: Estimated Treatment Effect by Democratic Partisanship




This is the estimated effect of the humiliation essay on a respondent's humiliation score compared with the control condition.

Figure 27: Estimated Treatment Effect by Democratic Partisanship (Binary)




This is the estimated effect of the humiliation essay on a respondent's humiliation score compared with the control condition.

Figure 28: Estimated Treatment Effect by Military Assertiveness




This is the estimated effect of the humiliation essay on a respondent's humiliation score compared with the control condition.

Figure 29: Estimated Treatment Effect by Military Assertiveness (Binary)



This is the estimated effect of the humiliation essay on a respondent's humiliation score compared with the control condition.

Figure 30: Estimated Treatment Effect by Race



This is the estimated effect of the humiliation essay on a respondent's humiliation score compared with the control condition.

## E Attrition on Treatment in Survey Experiment

The survey experiment suffers from attrition across treatment groups. Respondents assigned the humiliation and shame essays were more likely to drop out of the experiment than respondents assigned the control essay. This would be particularly problematic if a determinate of intervention support correlated with factors that made respondents more likely to drop out in certain conditions. However, neither military assertiveness, ideology, nor partisanship are significantly different between respondents in either the humiliation group or shame group and respondents in the control group. The only observable that is unbalanced is that men are slightly less likely to appear in the humiliation group (See Appendix section F.1 for full balance tests). This should bias against finding that humiliation increased support for intervention because being male and supporting intervention are positively correlated (Pearson’s  $r = 0.078$ ). However, this sex unbalance between conditions may exist due to chance, and modeling the propensity of respondents to drop out of the experiment finds no significant relationship with any observed demographic factor, including sex (see Appendix section 3).

Table 2: Respondents in Each Essay Group

Control	320
Humiliation	235
Shame	249
Total	804

One possible explanation for the selection on treatment is that respondents who anticipated experiencing more intense emotions as a result of the treatment essays were more likely to drop out of the experiment. Theoretically this should lead to an underestimate of the effect because the more intense the emotion is, the stronger its influence on motivation and attention should be. Likewise, more intense emotions should interfere more with the processing of information antithetical to their action tendencies (like cost).

During the course of the experiment, several strategies were tried to minimize attrition across treatment groups. These strategies include, doubling the payment for respondents in all conditions, moving the demographic (but not ideological) questions to the beginning of the survey, and using embedded data rather than the built-in Qualtrics randomization element to assign treatments (See Appendix section G.1 for a complete explanation). In the results shown in the main text, dummy variables for these changes to the survey are included, but the results are not sensitive to their removal.

Regardless of what is driving selection, the factors that lead respondents to drop out of the humiliation condition are likely similar to those that cause respondents to drop out of the shame condition. For this reason, subsetting on these two conditions should increase confidence that these factors are not driving the results. Appendix section K shows the results when only respondents who complete the survey in either the humiliation or shame condition are included. The loss of statistical power that comes with losing 320 out of 800 respondents renders the effects in the overall model insignificant, but the effects of humiliation and cost continue to be in the expected direction. Because the findings suggest that almost the entirety of the effect of humiliation comes through suppressing sensitivity to cost, it makes sense that a smaller sample might be unable to detect the effect of humiliation

when averaging over respondents in the costly and not costly conditions. Most importantly, even in this subset, humiliation in the costly condition significantly increases support for intervention. This rules out the concern that respondents who complete the survey in the shame and humiliation conditions might be less sensitive to costs in general.

## **E.1 Modeling Attrition**

Both the humiliation essay and the shame essay are associated with an increased propensity for respondents to drop out of the survey before completing it. However, no observed demographic characteristic significantly predicts attrition. I model the probability of a respondent dropping out of the experiment with a logistic regression. The First Wave dummy is negatively related to attrition because for the 200 respondents in this wave, the demographic questions were asked after the placebo questions. Because these covariates will be missing for respondents who dropped out in the First Wave, those that dropped out during the First Wave get kicked out of the model due to missing data.

Table 3: Attrition Model

	Attrition
Intercept	-1.22* (0.50)
Humiliation Essay	0.95*** (0.24)
Shame Essay	1.04*** (0.24)
Age	-0.01 (0.01)
Income	-0.02 (0.04)
Male	-0.20 (0.31)
Education	0.10 (0.36)
African-American	0.20 (0.36)
Asian	0.52 (0.74)
Hispanic	-11.78 (535.41)
Native American	-0.42 (0.79)
Pacific Islander	0.22 (0.18)
Other	-0.08 (0.07)
MTurk Today	0.00 (0.00)
MTurk Week	0.00 (0.00)
MTurk Life	-0.00 (0.00)
First Wave	-4.04*** (1.02)
Third Wave	0.03 (0.30)
Forth Wave	-0.11 (0.23)
Log Likelihood	-390.48
Num. obs.	972


\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$



## F Balance Tests

### F.1 Survey Experiment Balance Tests

Figure 31: Balance Test for Humiliation vs. Control



### F.2 Lab Experiment Balance Tests

Figure 32: Balance Test for Shame vs. Control





Figure 33: Balance Test for Humiliation vs. Control



## G Full Survey Instrument

### G.1 Difference Between Versions

The order of sections here reflects the order used for the final 604 respondents. For these respondents, randomization was performed with embedded data. For the first 200 respondents, the demographic questions came after the placebo questions. For these 200 respondents, randomization was conducted with the built-in Qualtrics randomization function. In an attempt to decrease attrition, 60 respondents (out of the group of 604) were recruited with double the \$1 pay of the other respondents. After 400 respondents had already completed the survey, the first ‘as’ was added to the status condition. In all the results shown, 3 dummy variables are added to account for these differences, but their removal does not affect the substantive results.

### G.2 Demographics Questions

How old are you (in years)?

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- Less than high school
- High school or GED
- Some college
- 2-year college degree
- 4-year College degree
- Doctoral degree
- Professional degree (e.g., JD or MD)

What is your race?

- Caucasian
- African-American
- Asian
- Hispanic
- Native American

- Pacific Islander
- Other

What is your combined annual household income?

- <30,000
- 30,000-40,000
- 40,000-50,000
- 50,000-60,000
- 60,000-70,000
- 70,000-80,000
- 80,000-90,000
- 90,000-100,000
- >100,000

Not including this current study, approximately how many MTURK studies have you participated in today?

Not including this current study, approximately how many MTURK studies have you participated in this week?

Not including this current study, approximately how many MTURK studies have you participated in your life?

### **G.3 Essay Tasks**

#### Control Essay

We'd like you to describe in detail your last trip to the grocery store. Begin by writing down what you remember of the event and continue by writing as detailed a description of the event as is possible.

Please write for several minutes. (Please avoid directly identifying yourself or others to help protect privacy. Instead other persons may be referred to using their relationship to you (e.g. friend, neighbor, classmate, stranger, etc.)

#### Humiliation Essay

We'd like you to describe in detail the one situation that makes you (or has made you) feel that, through no fault of your own, you were unjustly ridiculed or degraded and you were unable to immediately resolve the situation, meaning that you felt humiliated. This could be something you are presently experiencing or something from the past. Begin by writing down what you remember of the humiliating event and continue by writing as detailed a description of the event

as is possible. WHAT is the thing that makes you the most humiliated? WHY does it make you so humiliated?

Please write for several minutes. (Please avoid directly identifying yourself or others to help protect privacy. Instead other persons may be referred to using their relationship to you (e.g. friend, neighbor, classmate, stranger, etc.)

#### Shame Essay

We'd like you to describe in detail one situation that makes you (or has made you) feel that you knowingly acted unjustly and your activity was exposed, making you feel shame. This could be something you are presently experiencing or something from the past. Begin by writing down what you remember of the shameful event and continue by writing as detailed a description of the event as is possible.

WHAT is the thing that makes you feel the most shame? WHY does it shame you so much? Please write for several minutes. (Please avoid directly identifying yourself or others to help protect privacy. Instead other persons may be referred to using their relationship to you (e.g. friend, neighbor, classmate, stranger, etc.)

## G.4 Emotional Measures

For each component in the scale, respondents rate how much it describes how they feel from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The items are displayed in a list to respondents. Item order is randomized and factors are not labeled as to what emotion they correspond to.

Table 4: Emotional Measures

Emotion	Factors
Humiliation	Put down, Wronged, Debased, Bullied, Powerless, Scorned
Fear	Afraid, Scared, Frightened, Nervous, Jittery, Shaky
Guilt	Guilty, Disgusted with self, Angry at self, Blameworthy, Ashamed, Dissatisfied with self
Hostility	Angry, Hostile, Irritable, Scornful, Disgusted, Loathing

## G.5 Vignette

The following questions are about US relations with other countries around the world. You will read about a situation our country has faced many times in the past and will probably face again. We will describe the situation and ask you for your opinion on what decisions you would make.

A foreign government has begun a military invasion, sending its troops across the border of a smaller neighboring country. The invaded country shares interests with the US but is not a US ally.

## **G.6 Status Conditions**

[The order of the presentation of the status condition and the cost condition is randomized.]

Allowing the invasion to succeed would harm US interests [in Status Condition: as well as US world status].

## **G.7 Cost Conditions**

Best estimates suggest that if the United States intervened, the operation would [in Not Costly Condition: not] be very costly to the US.

## **G.8 Outcome Question**

[These two questions are combined to form a 4 point scale]

If the attacker cannot be talked into withdrawing, should our government use our military to push back the invaders, or should we stay out of it?

- Push back invaders
- Stay out of it

Do you feel strongly about this, or not very strongly?

- Strongly
- Not very strongly

## **G.9 Placebo Questions**

Do you believe that the country being invaded is a democracy?

- Yes
- No

Do you believe the invader is committing major human rights violations?

- Yes
- No

## G.10 Ideology, Party ID, and Military Assertiveness

[Questions about liberal and conservative ideology combined to form 6 point scale]

Generally speaking, would you consider yourself to be a liberal, a conservative, a moderate, or haven't you thought much about this?

- Liberal
- Conservative
- Moderate
- Haven't thought much about this

[If liberal is selected] Do you think of yourself as a strong liberal?

- Yes
- No

[If conservative is selected] Do you think of yourself as a strong conservative?

- Yes
- No

[If moderate or haven't thought much about this is selected] Do you think of yourself as more like a liberal or more like a conservative?

- Liberal
- Conservative

[Questions about party ID combined to form 6 point scale]

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Other

[If Democrat is selected] Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a strong Democrat?

- Strong Democrat
- Not a strong Democrat



[If Republican is selected] Would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a strong Republican?

- Strong Republican
- Not a strong Republican

[If Independent or other is selected] Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?

- Closer to the Republican Party
- Closer to the Democratic Party

[The following items compose the military assertiveness scale. Respondents rate items 1–8 Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, or Strongly disagree. Item 2 is reverse coded. Items 1–8 are displayed together with item order randomized. Items 9 and 10 are displayed together and respondents rate them as Not very good, Somewhat good, or Extremely good.]

1. The best way to ensure world peace is through American military strength
2. The use of military force only makes problems worse
3. Rather than simply reacting to our enemies, it's better for us to strike first
4. Generally, the more influence America has on other nations, the better off they are
5. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong
6. The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show that we have to crack down harder on troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order
7. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn
8. Although at times I may not agree with the government, my commitment to the U.S. always remains strong
9. When you see the American flag flying, does it make you feel extremely good, somewhat good, or not very good?
10. How important is military defense spending to you personally? Is it very important, important, or not at all important?

## H Full Lab Instrument

The demographics and ideology questions are the same as in the survey experiment with questions about MTurk use omitted.

The emotional measures are identical to those in the survey experiment. They are administered after the practice rounds to get pretreatment measures and after the essay treatment to get post-treatment measures.

The essay treatments are the same as those from the survey experiment except that the shame essay condition is not included.

### H.1 The Game

#### H.1.1 Instruction Screen

The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask a monitor questions as they arise. From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited. During the session you will make money. Upon completion of the session, *one* of the rounds of the game will be *randomly selected* for each player, and the amount you earned in that round will be paid to you. Payments are confidential: no other participant will be told the amount of money you make. Before the rounds eligible for payment begin, there will be 5 practice rounds to allow you to learn how the game works.

During each game, you will be randomly paired with a *different* person. No one, however, will know the identity of the person they are paired with. Nor will these identities be revealed after the session is complete.

In each pair, one person will have the role of first mover, and the other will have the role of second mover. The amount of money you earn depends on the decision you make and on the decision of the person you are paired with. You make your decision by choosing one of the options available to you and recording it on your computer.

You and your opponent each represent different countries that are deciding whether to go to war with each other. The first mover can choose either to attack or not. The second mover observes this choice and can then choose to either to attack or not. Each round you will be informed how much you and your opponent will earn for each outcome in the event that game is randomly selected at the end of the session.

After the practice rounds end, there are 4 rounds of the game that could randomly be selected for payment. Next, each participant will complete a personal essay task. Lastly, there are 4 more rounds of the game that could be randomly selected for payment.

#### H.1.2 First Mover Selection Screen

[For each game, respondents are randomly matched to an opponent and assigned to either be the first mover or the second mover. Each pair is randomly assigned to either play the game in the high cost of war condition or the low cost of war condition.]

Your opponent has the same payoffs as you do. These are your payoffs for this round: If both players choose Don't Attack, you will receive the following dollar amount:

6

If you choose Attack and your opponent chooses Don't Attack:

[In high cost condition: 5] 7

If you choose Don't Attack and your opponent chooses Attack:

[In high cost condition: 2] 4

If both players choose Attack:

[In high cost condition: 3] 5

You are moving first, so you must choose either Attack or Don't Attack without knowing what your opponent will chose. You Choose:

- Attack
- Don't Attack

### H.1.3 Second Mover Selection Screen

Your opponent has the same payoffs as you do. These are your payoffs for this round:

If both players choose Don't Attack, you will receive the following dollar amount:

6

If you choose Attack and your opponent chooses Don't Attack:

[In high cost condition: 5] 7

If you choose Don't Attack and your opponent chooses Attack:

[In high cost condition: 2] 4

If both players choose Attack:

[In high cost condition: 3] 5

You are moving second, so you get to see what your opponent chose before deciding. They chose:

[If the first mover chose Attack: Attack] Don't Attack

You Choose:

- Attack
- Don't Attack

### H.1.4 Round Payoff Screen

Your opponent chose: [if opponent chose Attack: Attack] Don't Attack

You chose: [if player chose Attack: Attack] Don't Attack

Your Profit for this round in dollars is: [payoff displayed]

### H.1.5 Final Payoff Screen

[After all of the games are played, one is randomly selected to determine payment. Respondents are informed of the round chosen and the amount they will receive.]

Out of the 8 games played, the following game was randomly selected for payment: [number 1–8 indicating the game selected]

In addition to the \$5 showup fee, you earned this dollar amount in the game randomly selected for payment: [amount they earned in that round]

# I Principle Component Analysis of Emotional Factors

If the humiliation measures introduced here are truly measuring an emotion of humiliation that is separate from the other emotions measured on the PANAS-X scale, a few empirical implications should hold. First, in a 4-factor principal component analysis—for humiliation plus fear, hostility (anger), and guilt (shame) from the PANAS-X scale—all of the humiliation items should load on the same factor. This is the case. Secondly, when a 3-factor model is used, the items from humiliation should continue to load on the same factor, and the items from hostility (anger) should also load on this factor. This is because “hostility is consubstantial to this emotion, so that people who feel humiliated perceive also that they are the targets of an external attack against their selves. In this regard, our results go in line with most of the existing literature which usually conceptualizes humiliation as a phenomenon closely related to interpersonal hostility or intergroup conflict” (Fernández et al. 2018, 10). The results for the 3-factor model also show this to be the case, suggesting that the items used here successfully capture the concept of humiliation.

Table 5: Factor Loadings with 4 Factors

Variable	RC1	RC2	RC3	RC4	h2	u2	com
emo_put_down	<b>0.807</b>	0.262	0.238	0.025	0.777	0.223	1.397
emo_wronged	<b>0.857</b>	0.093	0.212	0.096	0.797	0.203	1.174
emo_debased	<b>0.710</b>	0.228	<b>0.351</b>	<b>-0.321</b>	0.782	0.218	2.165
emo_bullied	<b>0.839</b>	0.077	0.250	-0.080	0.779	0.221	1.213
emo_powerless	<b>0.718</b>	0.273	<b>0.309</b>	0.164	0.712	0.288	1.807
emo_scorned	<b>0.760</b>	0.279	<b>0.339</b>	-0.166	0.798	0.202	1.799
emo_afraid	<b>0.343</b>	0.280	<b>0.790</b>	-0.040	0.821	0.179	1.649
emo_scared	<b>0.341</b>	<b>0.303</b>	<b>0.784</b>	-0.117	0.836	0.164	1.749
emo_frightened	<b>0.399</b>	0.285	<b>0.746</b>	-0.070	0.802	0.198	1.881
emo_nervous	<b>0.349</b>	0.300	<b>0.724</b>	0.162	0.762	0.238	1.949
emo_jittery	<b>0.364</b>	0.243	<b>0.733</b>	0.186	0.763	0.237	1.874
emo_shaky	<b>0.393</b>	0.262	<b>0.740</b>	0.053	0.772	0.228	1.821
emo_guilty	0.102	<b>0.845</b>	0.224	-0.077	0.781	0.219	1.189
emo_ashamed	0.297	<b>0.821</b>	0.198	0.010	0.801	0.199	1.387
emo_blameworthy	0.162	<b>0.828</b>	0.235	-0.149	0.789	0.211	1.314
emo_angry_self	0.236	<b>0.850</b>	0.206	0.130	0.838	0.162	1.331
emo_disgust_self	0.201	<b>0.849</b>	0.244	0.061	0.825	0.175	1.295
emo_angry	<b>0.760</b>	0.255	0.288	0.208	0.769	0.231	1.706
emo_hostile	<b>0.750</b>	0.156	<b>0.341</b>	0.120	0.718	0.282	1.557
emo_irritable	<b>0.660</b>	0.233	<b>0.330</b>	<b>0.443</b>	0.796	0.204	2.605
emo_scornful	<b>0.720</b>	0.259	<b>0.375</b>	-0.069	0.731	0.269	1.822
emo_disgusted	<b>0.610</b>	<b>0.524</b>	0.284	0.075	0.733	0.267	2.437
emo_loathing	<b>0.623</b>	<b>0.362</b>	<b>0.403</b>	-0.075	0.687	0.313	2.432
emo_dissatisfied_self	0.235	<b>0.828</b>	0.241	0.136	0.817	0.183	1.401
SS loadings	7.62	5.573	4.898	0.595			

Table 6: Factor Loadings with 3 Factors

Variable	RC1	RC2	RC3	h2	u2	com
emo_put_down	<b>0.811</b>	0.259	0.230	0.777	0.223	1.374
emo_wronged	<b>0.864</b>	0.091	0.201	0.795	0.205	1.131
emo_debased	<b>0.693</b>	0.219	<b>0.353</b>	0.653	0.347	1.716
emo_bullied	<b>0.836</b>	0.072	0.243	0.763	0.237	1.184
emo_powerless	<b>0.731</b>	0.273	0.298	0.698	0.302	1.627
emo_scorned	<b>0.753</b>	0.272	<b>0.336</b>	0.753	0.247	1.674
emo_afraid	<b>0.349</b>	0.278	<b>0.787</b>	0.819	0.181	1.656
emo_scared	<b>0.343</b>	0.299	<b>0.784</b>	0.821	0.179	1.690
emo_frightened	<b>0.404</b>	0.282	<b>0.744</b>	0.796	0.204	1.866
emo_nervous	<b>0.368</b>	<b>0.301</b>	<b>0.716</b>	0.738	0.262	1.888
emo_jittery	<b>0.384</b>	0.244	<b>0.724</b>	0.732	0.268	1.783
emo_shaky	<b>0.405</b>	0.261	<b>0.734</b>	0.771	0.229	1.845
emo_guilty	0.102	<b>0.843</b>	0.226	0.773	0.227	1.174
emo_ashamed	<b>0.302</b>	<b>0.819</b>	0.196	0.801	0.199	1.393
emo_blameworthy	0.158	<b>0.824</b>	0.238	0.761	0.239	1.244
emo_angry_self	0.249	<b>0.851</b>	0.201	0.826	0.174	1.288
emo_disgust_self	0.210	<b>0.849</b>	0.240	0.823	0.177	1.290
emo_angry	<b>0.776</b>	0.255	0.275	0.743	0.257	1.482
emo_hostile	<b>0.761</b>	0.155	<b>0.331</b>	0.712	0.288	1.459
emo_irritable	<b>0.691</b>	0.238	<b>0.312</b>	0.632	0.368	1.656
emo_scornful	<b>0.720</b>	0.254	<b>0.370</b>	0.719	0.281	1.778
emo_disgusted	<b>0.618</b>	<b>0.523</b>	0.276	0.732	0.268	2.362
emo_loathing	<b>0.622</b>	<b>0.358</b>	<b>0.399</b>	0.674	0.326	2.373
emo_dissatisfied_self	0.248	<b>0.829</b>	0.235	0.804	0.196	1.350
SS loadings	7.772	5.547	4.795			

## J Full Mediation Results

The presence of alternative mechanisms, such as other emotions, that go in different directions to the hypothesized mechanisms and get placed in the ADE make it possible to get a total effect of zero but have non-zero mediation effects (Myers and Tingley 2016; Renshon, Lee, and Tingley 2015, 581).

Table 7: Effect of Humiliation Essay on Humiliation Score

	Humiliation Score
Intercept	0.10*** (0.03)
Humiliation Essay	0.36*** (0.02)
Shame Essay	0.15*** (0.02)
First Wave	-0.03 (0.03)
Third Wave	-0.02 (0.04)
Forth Wave	0.00 (0.03)
Num. obs.	804


\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Table 8: Effect of Humiliation Essay and Score

	Intervention Support
Intercept	0.46*** (0.04)
Humiliation Score	0.11* (0.05)
Humiliation Essay	-0.04 (0.04)
Shame Essay	-0.00 (0.03)
Costly	-0.08** (0.03)
Status	0.00 (0.03)
First Wave	0.02 (0.04)
Third Wave	0.09 (0.05)
Forth Wave	0.07 (0.04)
Num. obs.	804

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Figure 34: Full Mediation Results for Humiliation



Results are produced by calling the mediation function from Tingley et al. (2014) on the models show in Tables 7 and 8.



Table 9: Effect of Humiliation Essay on Humiliation Score (Not Costly)

	Humiliation Score
Intercept	0.10** (0.03)
Humiliation Essay	0.34*** (0.03)
Shame Essay	0.15*** (0.03)
First Wave	-0.03 (0.04)
Third Wave	-0.05 (0.05)
Forth Wave	-0.01 (0.04)
Num. obs.	400

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Table 10: Effect of Humiliation Essay and Humiliation Score (Not Costly)

	Intervention Support
Intercept	0.46*** (0.06)
Humiliation Score	-0.00 (0.08)
Humiliation Essay	-0.04 (0.05)
Shame Essay	-0.00 (0.05)
Status	-0.01 (0.04)
First Wave	0.06 (0.06)
Third Wave	0.10 (0.08)
Forth Wave	0.12* (0.06)
Num. obs.	400

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Table 11: Effect of Humiliation Essay on Humiliation Score (Costly)

	Humiliation Score
Intercept	0.10** (0.04)
Humiliation Essay	0.39*** (0.03)
Shame Essay	0.15*** (0.03)
First Wave	-0.04 (0.04)
Third Wave	0.01 (0.05)
Forth Wave	0.02 (0.04)
Num. obs.	404


\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Table 12: Effect of Humiliation Essay and Humiliation Score (Costly)

	Intervention Support
Intercept	0.39*** (0.06)
Humiliation Score	0.19** (0.07)
Humiliation Essay	-0.03 (0.05)
Shame Essay	0.00 (0.05)
Status	0.00 (0.04)
First Wave	-0.02 (0.06)
Third Wave	0.08 (0.08)
Forth Wave	0.02 (0.06)
Num. obs.	404

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Figure 35: Full Mediation Results for Humiliation Varying Cost



Results for the not costly condition are produced by calling the mediation function from Tingley et al. (2014) on the models show in Tables 9 and 10. Results for the costly condition are produced by doing the same on the models from Tables 11 and 12.

Table 13: Effect of Humiliation Essay on Humiliation Score (Status not Invoked)

	Humiliation Score
Intercept	0.13*** (0.04)
Humiliation Essay	0.37*** (0.03)
Shame Essay	0.16*** (0.03)
First Wave	-0.08 (0.04)
Third Wave	-0.05 (0.05)
Forth Wave	-0.04 (0.04)
Num. obs.	400

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Table 14: Effect of Humiliation Essay and Humiliation Score (Status not Invoked)

	Intervention Support
Intercept	0.42*** (0.06)
Humiliation Score	0.14 (0.08)
Humiliation Essay	0.01 (0.05)
Shame Essay	0.01 (0.05)
Costly	-0.09* (0.04)
First Wave	0.07 (0.06)
Third Wave	0.08 (0.08)
Forth Wave	0.09 (0.06)
Num. obs.	400

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Table 15: Effect of Humiliation Essay on Humiliation Score (Status Fixed)

	Humiliation Score
Intercept	0.07 (0.04)
Humiliation Essay	0.36*** (0.03)
Shame Essay	0.14*** (0.03)
First Wave	0.01 (0.04)
Third Wave	0.01 (0.05)
Forth Wave	0.04 (0.04)
Num. obs.	404


\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Table 16: Effect of Humiliation Essay and Humiliation Score (Status Fixed)

	Intervention Support
Intercept	0.50*** (0.06)
Humiliation Score	0.08 (0.08)
Humiliation Essay	-0.08 (0.05)
Shame Essay	-0.02 (0.05)
Costly	-0.07 (0.04)
First Wave	-0.02 (0.06)
Third Wave	0.10 (0.08)
Forth Wave	0.05 (0.06)
Num. obs.	404

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Figure 36: Full Mediation Results for Humiliation Varying Status



Results for the status not fixed condition are produced by calling the mediation function from Tingley et al. (2014) on the models show in Tables 13 and 14. Results for the status fixed condition are produced by doing the same on the models from Tables 15 and 16.

Figure 37: Full Mediation Results for Shame




Figure 38: Full Mediation Results for Shame Varying Cost







Figure 39: Full Mediation Results for Shame Varying Status



# K Main Survey Results Subsetting on Respondents Assigned to Write About Either Humiliation or Shame

Figure 40: Treatment Effects




Figure 41: Cost Mechanism





Figure 42: Status Mechanism



## L Placebo Tests

These placebo tests conduct the same analysis in section 3.3 except on the subset of untreated subjects. If the results are driven by period effects or something other than treatment that correlates with the time of treatment, then the untreated subjects would also exhibit the effects found in 3.3. They do not.

Figure 43: Within Subject Placebo Test (All Rounds)




Figure 44: Within Subject Placebo Test (Excluding Last 2 Post-treatment Rounds)

